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Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), by and through their
counsel of record, respectfully submit their Appellants' Brief.
I.

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the

Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on March 31,1998. Though
filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996), this
appeal was assigned to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996). This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A brief statement of procedural history is necessary to the statement of issues. This

case was resolved by the trial court's grant of the first Motion for Summary Judgment of
plaintiff/appellee National Advertising Company ("National"). R. 78-81. The trial court
granted that motion even though the Crawfords were not parties to the action. Based on that
ruling, the trial court subsequently denied the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider, denied the
Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim, and granted National's
second Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 85-95, 222-23, 316-320, 348-51. In so ruling,
the trial court held that the outdoor advertising permit granted to the Crawfords by Murray
City (the "Crawfords' Permit") was null and void, and that National's outdoor advertising
permit ("National's Permit") was valid. The trial court's rulings spawn the following four
issues for review:
A.

Did the trial court violate the Crawfords' right to due process under the federal

and Utah constitutions by depriving them of property when they were not parties to the
action until after their permit was judicially invalidated, and were never served with a
summons, complaint, any pleadings relating to National's first Motion for Summary
Judgment, or the order granting that motion?

This question of law is reviewed for

correctness and this Court accords no deference to the trial court's rulings. See Doelle v.
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989). This issue was raised in the trial court at R.
86,90,93-94,292,305,330-31.
B.

Did the trial court err in denying the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider,

denying the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim, and granting
National's second Motion for Summary Judgment where the evidence presented after the
Crawfords entered the case established, as a matter of law, that issuing National's Permit
violated Section 17.68.160.C of the Murray City Zoning Ordinances? The standard of
review applicable to rulings made on motions for summary judgment is one of correctness
with no deference afforded to the trial court. See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,
107 (Utah 1991). This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 86-87, 90-94, 292, 306-08,
330-31.
C.

Did the trial court err in denying the Crawfords' Motion for Summary

Judgment on their Counterclaim even though National did not produce admissible evidence,
by affidavits or otherwise, identifying a genuine issue for trial? The standard of review
applicable to rulings made on motions for summary judgment is one of correctness with no
deference afforded to the trial court. $££ Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107. This issue was raised
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in the trial court at R. 306.
D.

Did the trial court err in granting National's second Motion for Summary

Judgment even though National failed to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 56 or Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 4-501 by failing to support its motion with a "Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts," and failing to provide any support for the alleged facts underlying the motion by
citation to any record evidence? The standard of review applicable to rulings made on
motions for summary judgment is one of correctness with no deference afforded to the trial
court. See Winegar, 813 P.2d at 107. This issue was raised in the trial court at R. 329.
III.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following the following statutory provisions and rules are determinative:

IV.

A.

U.S. Const., amend. XIV, §. See Addendum.

B.

Utah Const., art. 1, § 7. See Addendum.

C.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56. See Addendum.

D.

Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501. See Addendum.

E.

Section 17.68.160.C of the Murray City Zoning Ordinances. See Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves two competing permits for the construction and maintenance of an
outdoor advertising sign. The first was held by the Crawfords. The second permit was
subsequently issued to National. Murray City zoning ordinances preclude both permits from
coexisting. Thus, one permit must be invalidated. The trial court invalidated the Crawfords'
Page -3-

permit.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

National filed a Complaint on October 4, 1996, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Crawfords5 Permit was null and void. R. 1-9. Thereafter, National requested summary
judgment on its declaratory relief claim. R. 20-31. Before the Crawfords were parties, the
trial court granted summary judgment on December 6, 1996. R. 78-81. The trial court then
denied the Crawfords' subsequent Motion to Reconsider. R. 85-95, 222-23.
Later, National filed an Amended Complaint, adding the Crawfords as defendants and
seeking injunctive relief against them.

R. 214-21.

The Crawfords answered and

counterclaimed, asserting that their permit was valid and that National's Permit was invalid.
R. 229-41. The Crawfords then requested summary judgement on their Counterclaim. R.
259-93. The trial court denied that motion on October 14, 1997. R. 316-320.
Subsequently, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that
not all issues had been resolved, that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed with
prejudice, and that the validity of the two permits had been resolved in the prior motions for
summary judgment. R. 321-25. On March 31, 1998, the trial court granted National's
motion, disposing of all remaining issues. R. 348-51.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1.

In December of 1974, National entered into a lease (the "Lease") which

allowed it to construct and maintain an outdoor advertising sign on real property located at
approximately 4982 South 300 West, Murray, Utah, along the 1-15 corridor (the "Property").
Page -4-

R. 96-97.
2.

On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords, who were out of the country until the end

of July of 1996, granted their son Brad Crawford a general power of attorney. R. 101-04.
3.

In December of 1995, Brad Crawford exercised that power of attorney and

purchased the Property on behalf of his parents, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor
under the Lease. R. 99 at f 5.
4.

Brad Crawford paid a premium for the Property because of the presence of an

outdoor advertising sign site on the Property. See id.
5.

Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall commence on February

1, 1975, and continue for ten years. R. 96 at f 3.
6.

Paragraph 3 of the Lease further provides that the Lease shall continue for an

additional ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless terminated by the Lessor as of
any subsequent anniversary of the Lease upon at least sixty days written notice. See id.
7.

Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides:

In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling,
as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's
displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety
(90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy of the building
permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch
Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously
paid for the unexpired portion of this Lease beyond the termination date. The
Lessee agrees to remove its displays within the 90 day period.
R. 97 at If 9.
8.

Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23,1996, the Crawfords notified
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National in writing that it was developing the Property and that National's sign must be
removed. R. 278-79.
9.

As of June 10, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the

Crawfords sent a second letter to National demanding removal of the sign so that the
development of the Property could proceed. The Crawfords enclosed a copy of the building
permit authorizing development of the Property. R. 280-81, 283.
10.

As of August 7, 1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date, the

Crawfords sent a third letter to National demanding removal of the sign. The Crawfords
enclosed a copy of the site plan for the development of the Property, though they were not
required to do so. R. 286-288.
11.

On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not been

terminated, Martin S. Tanner, an attorney for the Crawfords, notified National and its
attorney in writing, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, that the Lease would be terminated
as of February 1, 1997, the next anniversary date of the Lease. This notification gave
National 67 days notice of termination. R. 275.
12.

Prior to terminating the Lease, on March 5, 1996, the Crawfords submitted an

application to Murray City for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property.
The application was granted and the Crawfords' Permit issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at
H5;63.
13.

The Crawfords' Perimt was initially valid for 180 days, or until September 25,

1996. However, it is Murray City's custom, practice and policy to extend the initial 180-day
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v

& 32,

Under Murray City Zoning Ordinances, one of the permits must be m\ alioaied. i ^ Section
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17.

In this regard, National applied for its permit on April 30, 1996. R. 65.

However, the Crawfords applied for their permit on March 5, 1996, and the Crawfords'
Permit was issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at If 5; 63. Thus, at the time Murray City issued
National's Permit, the Crawfords held a valid permit that precluded the issuance of
National's Permit.
18.

National filed a Complaint on October 4,1996, seeking a declaratory judgment

that the Crawfords' Permit was null and void. However, the Crawfords were not served with
a summons or a copy of the complaint, as evidenced by the lack of any return of service in
the record. In fact, the Crawfords were not even named as defendants in that action. Rather,
National named only Murray City as a defendant. R. 1-9.
19.

Murray City answered and counterclaimed for Interpleader, naming the

Crawfords as parties and alleging: (1) that the Crawfords were the real party in interest
because they stood to lose their vested interest in their permit; and (2) that Murray City was
a neutral party who was not able to determine which permit was valid. R. 13-19.
20.

Although Murray City asked the Crawfords' counsel at the time to accept

service of the Counterclaim for Interpleader, there is no admissible evidence in the record
that the Crawfords' counsel agreed to do so and there is no signed Acceptance of Service
in the record. Additionally, the Crawfords were not served with the relevant pleadings as
required by Utah R. Civ. P. 4, as evidenced by the lack of any return of service in the record
or any reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 19.
21.

Thereafter, National filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its declaratory
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with any summons or complaint), they were not served with a copy of the papers relating to
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27.

The trial court denied the Crawfords' motion on October 14, 1997. R. 316-

28.

Thereafter, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing

320.

that not all issues had been resolved, that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed
with prejudice, and that the validity of the two permits had already been resolved in the prior
summary judgment motions. R. 321-25.
29.

National's

memorandum in support of its second motion for summary

judgment omitted a "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" as required by Utah Code Jud.
Admin. R. 4-501(2)(A). That pleading also omitted citation to any record evidence for its
alleged facts, as required by Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. Rule 4-501 (2)(A) and Utah R. Civ.
P. 56. See id.
30.

The Crawfords opposed National's second Motion for Summary Judgment by,

among other things, informing the Court that "as indicated by the lack of any return of
service in the Court's file, the Crawfords were never served with process in this case," that
"as demonstrated by the mailing certificates on the pleadings filed by plaintiff in connection
with its first motion for summary judgment, the Crawfords were never served with copies
of any of those pleadings," and, therefore, that "the Crawfords had no involvement in this
case until after the Court entered its order granting plaintiffs first motion for summary
judgment." R. 330.
31.

On March 31, 1998, the trial court granted National's second Motion for

Summary Judgement without a hearing. R. 348-51.
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A.

On rare occasions, either through oversight or otherwise, trial courts o\ erlook

constitutional rights to due process. This is such a case. Before the Crawfords were parties
to this case, and e\ en mougn
.,>t , p .

-

w

r

• •,{) Court declared that the Crawfords'5 Permit was null and void.

By doing so in the Crawfords' absence, the trial court swept aside the Crawfords' protected
property interest without an opportunity i
ui •

•

I-- • ik-u ^

'

--it due process of law. This

unconstitutional ruling also is the basis for the trial court's: (1) denial of the Crawfords'
Motion to Reconsider; (2) denial of the Crawford;* Motion ioi Summary Judgment on men
"x

Counieiv..!..:.. »

**••'•,

•ihn: invalidating the Crawfords* Permit is based -ju uus pervasive underlying
reversible error. Consequently, each ruling must be reversed.
" Lftei joining this action, the Ci aw foi (is pi esei ited e v idence that pi ecli ide> i tl i *
\r\\ a. :.:•'

=:• - - T* * ^II -*- l *•- -. ^unimaiv invalidation) and established the invalidity

of National's Perm.it as a matter of law. Ignoring this evidence, the trial court, without
hearing, affirmed its i tiling on .\aiio;.«i ^ ; „t,i .../,.. .
t ''• i

• •• • •

..

. • ,-; . ;>

- M . n.inir-,-! \ itionaPs second Motion for Summary Judgment. Ihe

trial court erred by ignoring the evidence and failing to grant summan judgment for the
Crawfords, or at a minimum, ruiing that summary judgment foi :\;*iiv>na; was preclude.: by
genuine, 11iiiK i iii! relics ol hu I.
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C.

The trial court erred in denying the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment

on their Counterclaim because National adduced no record evidence contrary to the evidence
presented by the Crawfords. Rather, National simply rested on its pleadings and unsupported
statements, some of which were contradicted by the record. National's "facts" (sheer
allegations and unsupported and/or untrue statements) as a matter of law did not establish any
genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the Crawfords.
Accordingly, the Crawfords are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their counterclaim.
D.

The trial court erred in granting National's second Motion for Summary

Judgment because, contrary to Utah R. Civ. P. 56 or Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501,
National offered no "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" or any support for National's
alleged facts on which its motion hinged. The trial court's grant of National's unsupported
motion constitutes reversible error.
VI.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED THE CRAWFORDS OF A VESTED
PROPERTY INTEREST WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The trial court committed constitutional error when it invalidated the Crawfords'
Permit, by granting National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, in the Crawfords'
absence. On this first fatally flawed ruling, the trial court based its subsequent denial of the
Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider and the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on
their Counterclaim, and its grant of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment. R.
78-81, 316-20, 348-51. The trial court did so even though the Crawfords' were not parties
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served with a Summons, the Complaint or the pleadings relating to Nationars first Motion
for Summary Judgment... The trial court's rulings denied, the Crawfbrds due process and
should be reversed.
*- vides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art, 1, § 7. Similar!}, the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United. States Constitution provides that no state snau uepr. x e ..m: | vi .^»n
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%%
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u„.iienstein ; 616I " 2< 1608,61 3(1 J" , lit ,. 15 8 1 )
The first step in due process analysis is the identification of some liberty or property
interest held by the aggrieved party. See id, 616 P.2d at -10. The Utah. Supreme Court
applies a tiexibie ueiinition ui

t
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See Celebrit) Club un.

> 2d 1293,1296-97 (Utah 1982). The Court has stated

that property interests subject to due process guarantees "are not limited b\ a few rigid.
technical forms. kuilier. "propeiu quotes a Diuaa range of mieie^: i:.,u u;^ >eeu
k
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'-*• - -i.!:- -

*

.u Pern \, binderma:^. 408 U.S. 593,

601 (1972)). More recently, the Court observed that "property interests 'are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem.from,an independent
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;
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U.S. 564,577(1972)).
Applying these standards, the Court has held that permits and/or licenses like those
here are protected property interests. For example, in Celebrity Club Inc, 657 P.2d at 1293,
this Court held that the operator of a state liquor store operated in a private club pursuant to
a lease granted by the Utah Liquor Control Commission possessed a property interest in the
lease to which constitutional due process protections applied. Similarly, the Court in
Anderson v, Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), the
Court found that the plaintiff held a "substantial property interest" in the expected renewal
of the licensing of his business which entitled him to constitutional due process protections,
explaining:
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person to initiate and develop a
business which provides services to the public and employment for others is
vital to the common welfare. By the same token that a business must operate
in accordance with lawful regulations and requirements, it should be the policy
of the law, and of officials charged with its administration, the encourage such
initiative and enterprise by according it all proper protections of the law.
Id. at 1216. The Court continued, stating:
[I]nasmuch as the licensing of his business does represent a substantial
property interest to plaintiff, which also has its effect upon the public welfare,
it should not be destroyed or disrupted arbitrarily, nor without following
fundamental standards of due process of law to guard against capricious or
oppressive administrative action.
Id. at 1216.
Under these principles, the Crawfords Permit was a vested, protected property interest.
The permit entitled the Crawfords to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property and
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to sell space on that sign to advertisers. In essence, the Crawfords' Permit granted a right to
run an outdoor advertising business on the Property. Such a business can be very lucrative.
Indeed, the Property is located along 1-15 and, therefore, is visible to tens of thousands, if not
hundreds of thousands, of motorists every day. Business owners will pay substantial sums
of money to owners of outdoor advertising signs located along 1-15 for advertising space.
That is why Brad Crawford paid a premium for the Property. R. 99 at ^J 5. Additionally,
because Murray City zoning ordinaces require outdoor adverting signs to be constructed at
least 500 feet apart, the number of permitsissued is limited. Accordingly, the Crawfords, like
the plaintiffs in Celebrity Club Inc. and Anderson, hold a protected property interest in their
outdoor advertising permit to which constitutional due process protections apply.
After establishing a property interest like the Crawfords', the next step in due process
analysis is to determine what process is due before that interest can be impaired. &££
Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d at 610. This Court has stated that "'[t]he purpose of due process is
to prevent fundamental unfairness.'" State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994) (quoting State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319, 1325 (UtahCt.
App. 1991), csrt. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1992)). The Utah Supreme Court has
elaborated on that holding and explained the due process guarantee this way:
[N] either a court nor other judicial tribunal may deny a person a constitutional
right or deprive such person of a vested interest in property without any
opportunity to be heard. To do so constitutes taking of property without due
process of law."
Celebrity Club Inc.. 657 P.2d at 1296 (quoting Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 71
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Utah 112, 125, 263 P. 78, 82 (1927)). The Court continued by noting:
Many attempts have been made to further define udue process" but they all
resolve into the thought that a party shall have his day in court—that is each
party shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause of his
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record thus made.
Id. (quoting Christiansen v, Harris, 109 Utah 1, 6-7,163 P.2d 314, 316 (1945)). The Court
concluded, stating that "the essential requirement of due process is that every citizen be
afforded his 'day in court,"' adding that "'[i]t has always been the policy of our law to
resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a
controversy."' Id. (quoting Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976)).
The Crawfords were deprived of due process, as defined in Celebrity Club Inc.
Indeed, National requested that the Crawfords' Permit be declared null and void in its
Complaint filed on October 4, 1996. However, the Crawfords were not served with a
summons or a copy of the complaint. R. 1-9 (evidencing no return of service). The
Craw fords were not even named then as defendants. National named only Murray City as
a defendant. Id.
Only when Murray City answered and countercl aimed for Interpleader were the
Crawfords named as parties. Murray City alleged: (1) that the Crawfords were the real party
in interest because they stood to lose their vested interest in their permit; and (2) that Murray
City was a neutral party who was not able to determine which permit was valid. R. 13-19.
Although Murray City initially asked the Crawfords' counsel at the time to accept service of
the Counterclaim for Interpleader, there is no admissible evidence in the record that the
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Crawfords' counsel agreed to do so and there is no signed Acceptance of Service in the
record. Additionally, the Crawfords were not served with the relevant pleadings as required
by Utah R. Civ. P. 4, as evidenced by the lack of any return of service in the record or any
reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 19.
Thereafter, National filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its declaratory relief
claim. R. 20-31. Because the Crawfords were not parties (they had not been served with any
summons or complaint), they were not served with a copy of the papers relating to the
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 21,28 (evidencing no reference to the Crawfords or their
attorney in the certificates of service).
Though the Crawfords were not served with National's Complaint, Murray City's
Counterclaim, or the pleadings relevant to National's motion, the trial court granted
National's Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled that the Crawfords' Permit was null and
void. R. 78-81. The Crawfords were not served with a copy of this order, as evidenced by
the lack of reference to the Crawfords or their attorney in the certificate of service. R. 81.
Though not served, the Crawfords learned of the trial court's ruling. The Crawfords filed a
Motion to Reconsider, pointing out, among other things, that the order nullifying their permit
had been entered in their absence. R. 85-95. The trial court denied that motion. R. 222-23.
Subsequently, National filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint and
a proposed First Amended Complaint. R. 210-21. The trial court granted that motion on
February 3, 1997. R. 224-25. National's First Amended Complaint added the Crawfords as
defendants and sought injunctive relief against them. R. 214-21. The Crawfords filed
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answered and counterclaimed, asserting that their permit was valid and that National's Permit
was invalid. R. 229-41. The Crawfords then moved for summary judgement on their
Counterclaim based, in part, on the facts set forth above. R. 259-93. The trial court denied
the Crawfords' motion on October 14, 1997. R. 316-320.
Thereafter, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that not
all issues had been resolved, that the Crawfords' Counterclaim should be dismissed with
prejudice, and that the validity of the two permits had already been resolved in the prior
summary judgment motions. R. 321-25. The Crawfords opposed National's second Motion
for Summary Judgment by, among other things, informing the Court that "as indicated by the
lack of any return of service in the Court's file, the Crawfords were never served with
process in this case," that "as demonstrated by the mailing certificates on the pleadings filed
by plaintiff in connection with its first motion for summary judgment, the Crawfords were
never served with copies of any of those pleadings," and, therefore, that "the Crawfords had
no involvement in this case until after the Court entered its order granting plaintiffs first
motion for summary judgment." R. 330. On March 31, 1998, the trial court granted
National's second Motion for Summary Judgement without a hearing. R. 348-51.
In sum, the Crawfords never received their day in Court. Before the Crawfords were
parties, and even though the Crawfords' Permit is a vested property interest subject to due
process protection, the trial court declared that the Crawfords' Permit was null and void. By
doing so in the Crawfords' absence, the trial court swept aside the Crawfords' protected
property interest without an opportunity to heard. In other words, granting National's first
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Motion for Summary Judgment constitutes a taking of property without due process of law.
See Celebrity Club Inc., 657 P.2d at 1296 (quoting Hailing, 71 Utah at 125, 263 P. at 82).
This unconstitutional ruling subsequently formed the basis for the trial court's: (1) denial of
the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider; (2) denial of the Crawfords' Motion for Summary
Judgment on their Counterclaim; and (3) granting of National's second Motion for Summary
Judgment. Each trial court ruling invalidating the Crawfords' Permit is based on this
pervasive underlying reversible error. Consequently, each ruling must be reversed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR THE CRAWFORDS, OR AT A MINIMUM, RULING
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR NATIONAL WAS PRECLUDED
BY GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT,

Despite their absence, and despite not being served with the pleadings and order
related to National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, the Crawfords learned that the trial
court granted National's first motion. Thereafter, the Crawfords filed two motions in which
they presented evidence that precluded the summary invalidation of their permit and
mandated the invalidation of National's Permit. Ignoring that evidence, the trial court
affirmed its ruling on National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the Crawfords'
two motions, and granted a second Motion for Summary Judgment filed by National. The
trial court's failure to consider the evidence presented by the Crawfords provides a second
basis for reversal.
Indeed, the evidence presented by the Crawfords subsequent to the trial court's initial
nullification of their permit established the following: In December of 1974, National entered
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the Lease. R. 96-97. On January 6, 1995, the Crawfords, who were out of the country until
the end of July of 1996, granted their son Brad Crawford a general power of attorney. R.
101-04. In December of 1995, Brad Crawford exercised that power of attorney and
purchased the Property on behalf of his parents, who succeeded to the interests of the lessor
under the Lease. R. 99 at ^f 5. Brad Crawford paid a premium for the Property because of
the presence of an outdoor advertising sign site on the Property. See id.
Paragraph 3 of the Lease provides that the Lease shall commence on February 1,
1975, and continue for ten years. R. 96 at ^ 3. Paragraph 3 of the Lease further provides that
the Lease shall continue for an additional ten years, and thereafter from year to year, unless
terminated by the Lessor as of any subsequent anniversary of the Lease upon at least sixty
days written notice. See id.
Paragraph 9 of the Lease provides:
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling,
as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's
displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon giving the Lessee ninety
(90) days written notice of termination, together with a copy of the building
permit, by registered mail to either the Lessee's Home Office or the Branch
Office listed, and upon the Lessor's refunding to the Lessee the rent previously
paid for the unexpired portion of this Lease beyond the termination date. The
Lessee agrees to remove its displays within the 90 day period.
R. 97 at Tf 9. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, on April 23, 1996, the Crawfords notified
National in writing that it was developing the Property and that National's sign must be
removed. R. 278-79. As of June 10,1996, National had not removed its sign. On that date,
the Crawfords sent a second letter to National demanding removal of the sign so that the
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development of the Property could proceed. The Crawfords enclosed a copy of the building
permit authorizing development of the Property. R. 280-81, 283. As of August 7, 1996,
National had not removed its sign. On that date, the Crawfords sent a third letter to National
demanding removal of the sign. The Crawfords enclosed a copy of the site plan for the
development of the Property, though they were not required to do so. R. 286-288. In other
words, the evidence presented by the Crawfords after they joined this matter established that
the Crawfords complied fully with paragraph 9 of the Lease. Consequently, the evidence
before the trial court established that the Lease was terminated pursuant to paragraph 9 of the
Lease as of July 29, 1996.
Even if termination on this ground was found to be ineffective (and it was effective),
the evidence presented by the Crawfords established that the lease was properly terminated
by another means. On November 25, 1996, to avoid any argument that the Lease had not
been terminated, Martin S. Tanner, an attorney for the Crawfords, notified National and its
attorney in writing, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Lease, that the Lease would be terminated
as of February 1, 1997, the next anniversary date of the Lease. This notification gave
National 67 days notice of termination. R. 275. Accordingly, the evidence before the trial
court indicated that the Crawfords terminated the Lease pursuant to paragraph 3 effective
Feoruary 1, 1997.
Prior to terminating the Lease, on March 5, 1996, the Crawfords submitted an
application to Murray City for a permit to erect an outdoor advertising sign on the Property.
The application was granted and the Crawfords' Permit issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at
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Tf 5; 63. The Crawfords' Perimt was initially valid for 180 days, or until September 25,
1996. On September 3, 1996, Murray City followed this custom, practice and policy and
granted a 180-day extension of the Crawfords' Permit. R. 106, 107, 276-77. This extended
the validity of the Crawfords' Permit for 180 days beyond September 25, 1996, or until
March 24, 1997. No contrary evidence was introduced.
On September 10, 1996, National represented to Murray City that the Lease would
not expire during the initial 180-day life of the Crawfords' Permit.

Based on that

representation, Murray City rescinded the Crawfords' Permit. However, on September 18,
1996, after learning that the removal of National's sign and construction of the Crawfords'
sign could occur within the time allowed by Murray City's September 3, 1996 extension,
Murray City understandably reinstated the Crawfords' Permit. R. 61 at ^ 12 & 13.
On August 5, 1996, Murray City issued a second sign permit ("National's Permit")
authorizing National to erect an outdoor advertising sign within 500 feet of where Murray
City had authorized the Crawfords to construct a sign. R. 60-61 atfflf8 & 9. Murray City's
zoning ordinances prohibit any off-premise advertising sign from being constructed within
a radius of 500 feet of another off-premise advertising sign. See Section 17.68.160.C of the
Murray City Zoning Ordinances (included in Addendum). The signs authorized by the
Crawfords' Permit and National's Permit are off-premise signs, as that phrase is used in the
Murray City Zoning Ordinances. If constructed according to the respective permits, the signs
would be within 500 feet of each other. R. 6 atfflf31 & 32. Under Murray City Zoning
Ordinances, one of the permits must be invalidated. In this regard, National applied for its
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permit on April 30,1996. R. 65. However, the Crawfords applied for their permit on March
5, 1996, and the Crawfords5 Permit was issued on March 29, 1996. R. 60 at t 5; 63. Thus,
at the time Murray City issued National's Permit, the Crawfords held a valid permit that
precluded the issuance of National's Permit.
In sum, after joining this action, the Crawfords presented evidence that precluded
invalidation of their permit (much less summary invalidation) and established the invalidity
of National's Permit as a matter of law. Ignoring this evidence, the trial court, without a
hearing, affirmed its ruling on National's First Motion for Summary Judgment, and denied
the Crawfords' two motions and granted National's second Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court erred by not acknowledging the evidence and failing to grant summary
judgment for the Crawfords, or at a minimum, ruling that summary judgment for National
was precluded by genuine, material issues of fact.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE CRAWFORDS'
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THEIR
COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NATIONAL ADDUCED NO RECORD
EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
CRAWFORDS.

In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment on their Counterclaim, the
Crawfords presented evidence establishing that their permit was valid and that National's
Permit was invalid. R. 259-93. In response, National presented no contrary evidence by
affidavit of otherwise, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56 and Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4501. Rather, National improperly rested on conclusory allegations and denials of its
pleadings. Despite this, the trial court erroneously denied the Crawfords' motion.
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The Crawfords demonstrated, through documents and affidavits, that they are entitled
to summary judgment because, as a matter of law, National's Permit should never have been
granted. R. 259-93. Consequently, to preclude summary judgment for the Crawfords,
National was required to establish a genuine disputed material fact through admissible
evidence. Indeed, as noted by Utah R. Civ. P. 56, "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." A
cursory review of National's opposing memorandum reveals that National did exactly what
Rule 56 precludes. National did not set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise
showing the existence of a genuine issue. Rather, National simply rested upon unsupported
allegations and denials of its pleadings. R. 294-99. Thus, Rule 56 mandated that summary
judgment for the Crawfords be granted. Indeed, that rule states that if a party opposing
summary judgment does not satisfy the burden imposed by Rule 56, summary judgment
"shall be entered against him." Sfi£ Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Despite the
clear mandate of Rule 56, the trial court denied the Crawfords' motion, thereby committing
reversible error. R. 318-320.
National half-heartedly attempted to satisfy its Rule 56 burden by arguing (again
without supporting evidence) that the Crawfords' could not terminate the Lease under
paragraph 9 because they did not submit a building permit. R. 297. National's unsupported
assertion was is simply false. The evidence of record indicates that prior to terminating the
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Lease, the Crawfords forwarded a copy of the building permit to National pursuant to
Paragraph 9 of the Lease. R. 280-81, 283. The Crawfords pointed this out to the trial court,
as well as the fact that National had submitted no evidence to the contrary. R. 306-307.
Thus, it was undisputed that the Crawfords effectively terminated the Lease on July 29,1996
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease.
National also argued (also without citation to evidence) that the Crawfords' Permit
was invalid because the Crawfords could not erect their sign before the expiration of their
permit. This unsupported argument is also false. The Crawfords' presented evidence that
their permit was valid until March 24, 1997. R. 106, 107, 276-77. National did not dispute
this fact. And, as noted above, the Crawfords presented evidence establishing that the Lease
was terminated, at the latest, effective February 1, 1997, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the
Lease. R. 275.
Thus, according to undisputed evidence, National was under a legal obligation to
remove its sign on or before February 1, 1997. Because the Crawfords' Permit was valid
until March 24,1997, the Crawfords had at least two months after the date on which National
was obligated to remove its sign to construct their own. Consequently, contrary to National's
bald assertion, the evidence proved that the Crawfords could erect their sign within the time
limit allowed by their permit. This evidence also was apparently ignored. R. 303-12.
In sum, National's failure to adduce contrary admissible evidence and reliance solely
upon mere allegations and unsupported statements could not establish the existence of any
genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment for the Crawfords.
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Accordingly, the Crawfords were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their
counterclaim. In denying the motion, the trial court committed reversible error.
D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING NATIONAL'S SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56 OR UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-501,
NATIONAL OFFERED NO "STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
MATERIAL FACTS" OR ANY SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL'S
ALLEGED FACTS ON WHICH ITS MOTION HINGED.

After the trial court denied the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their
Counterclaim, National filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment. National did not
support that motion with a "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" as required by Rule 4501(2)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. R. 323-25. Nor did National provide
any support for the alleged facts underlying the motion by citation to any record evidence as
required by Rule 4-501 (2)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. As a result, National did not establish any
properly supported undisputed facts in support of its second Motion for Summary Judgment.
This deficiency was brought to the Court's attention by the Crawfords.

R. 328-31.

Notwithstanding National's failures to establish entitlement to summary judgment, the trial
court granted National's motion. Clearly, the trial court's action in this regard constitutes
reversible error.
VII.

CONCLUSION
The protection against the deprivation of property without due process is one of this

nation's most important constitutional guarantees. The trial court ignored this cornerstone
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of our judicial system by invalidating the Crawfords5 Permit in the Crawfords' absence.
Subsequent to this summary invalidation of their permit, the Crawfords presented evidence
that precluded nullification of their permit and mandated invalidation of National's Permit.
National offered nothing to contradict that evidence but mere allegations and unsupported
statements, some of which were simply untrue. The trial court ignored National's failures
in this regard, affirmed its prior ruling, and a second, unsupported Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by National. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Crawfords have never
received their day in court. Indeed, the trial court never gave the evidence presented by the
Crawfords a cursory review, let alone the type of fair and serious review required by the Utah
and federal constitutions. This Court should remedy this denial of due process by, at the very
least, reversing the trial court's rulings invaliding the Crawfords' Permit, including its grant
of National's first Motion for Summary Judgment, denial of the Crawfords' Motion to
Reconsider, and grant of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally,
the record provides this Court with ample support for going one step further and reversing
the trial court's denial of the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their
Counterclaim.
DATED this 30th day of November, 1998.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of November, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Donald L.Dalton, Esq.
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Randy B. Hart, Esq.
Assistant Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
Post Office Box 57520
Murray Utah, 84157
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY
PLAINTIFF
VS
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 960906952 CV
DATE 12/02/96
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION FILED NOVEMBER 25, 1996, THE
COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE SUPPORTING MEMORANDA.
2. COUNSEL FOR MOVANT TO PREPARE THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT.

Case No: 960906952 CV
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the

3$^

day of

t£>^.

WLo

I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the
attached document to the following:
RANDY B HART
Atty for Defendant
5025 SOUTH STATE STREET
P.O. BOX 57520
MURRAY UT 84157-0520

THOMAS T. BILLINGS
Atty for Plaintiff
50 SO MAIN STREET, #1600
P.O. BOX 45340
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145

District Court Clerk
By:

1

0„Deputy
foawCler*

.

TabB

FlLmD!5??JC? COURT
Third JtJdicia' District

•DEC 61996
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Thomas T. B i l l i n g s (0331)
D o n a l d L. D a l t o n (4305)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 S o u t h Main S t r e e t , S u i t e 1600
P. O. Box 4 5 3 4 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff and
Counterclaim
Defendant,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 960906952CV
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a
Utah municipality,

Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick

Defendant and
Counterclaimant,
GENE V. CRAWFORD and SHERRY
T. CRAWFORD dba VAL-DEV,
L•L• C• ,
Counterclaim
Defendants.
The Motion for Summary Judgment of plaintiff,
National Advertising Company, having come before the Court
without hearing, the Court having reviewed the pleadings, and
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted for the reasons specified in the
supporting memoranda and Permit No. 14956 issued by defendant,
Murray City Corporation, is null and void.

DATED this

&k day of A

19

SL

BY THE COURT:

rict C a u i ^ f j S ^
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT to be handdelivered this

day of December, 1996, to the following:

Randy B. Hart, Esq,
Assistant Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
P.O. Box 57520
Murray, Utah 84157
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*N THE -THIRD JUDICIAL„ DISTRICT ^COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE rENTRY
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY
PLAINTIFF
VS
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION
DEFENDANT

CASESNUMBER "9 609 0 6952 **CV
DATE|09/22/97l
HONORABLE SfcJ^ DENNIS IfcREDERICK
COURTfUEPORTER
COURTICLERK CLB

TYPE OF HEARINQj
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF^THE PLEADINGS ^AND .'UPON R E C E I P T ^ "THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT .FOR^DECISION .JFILED SEPTEMBER '12j$19SC?~,'
THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS.« , ^ J t ' - J S F S E S * 1 1 ;:CRAWFORDS> REQUEST ^F0R.^RAL1^iRGUMENT^dNV1aCTS,
MOTION FOR, SUMMARY
,JUDGMENT} ^ETCi IS^ENIED/AS^UNT^QlELYtPER '
S ^ ^ ^ S S l i& ill C • J.Ar^PHE rMATTER IS" RULED' ON"aPERfTHE>iEOUI
>*EOUESra
FOR DECISION SUBMITTED.
xs

3 . COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO PREPARE/.fTHE .APPROPRfATE.aORDERl

Case No: 960906952 .CV
"Certificate of Mailing

I ..-certify f that„on ,1me • ol5 -. day -of

£e^<

\&?l

I-.sentVby'tf irstvclassTmail a ,true ,and ^correct copy of the
attached clocuaent "to the'following:
RANDY^B HART
Atty for Defendant
'5025 SOUTH STATE STREET
P.O.'30X 57520
MURRAY -UT 84157-0520

BRADLEY R CAHOON
Atty '-for7Plaintif f
50 SOUTH;MAIN .STREET STE 1600
PJO.VBOX £45340
SALTOAKE CITY UT 84145

MARTIN S .TANNER
Atty for Defendant
340 BROADWAY CENTER
111 EAST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-5250

DONALD *L4)ALTON
Atty.^for 'Plaintiff
50 SO MAIN, SUITE 1600
P.O. ,B0X 45340
SALTsIAKE CITY UT 84145

R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
Atty- for Defendant <
50 SOUTH MAIN SUITE 850
SALT LAKE CITY',UT,84144

STEVE K GORDON
Atty-"for Defendant
,50 SOUTH'MAIN STREET
SUITE 850 ^EY BANK TOWER
SALT^LAKE CITY- UT 84144
District^Court.Clerk
py?***«**-

1

IDeputy Cler
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP^THE THIRD JJUDICIAL^pISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY/ JSTATEJOT JUTAE;

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, s

MINUTE {^NTRYi RULING
tJASEiNO^S^09O6«S2^iC^

PLAINTIFF

VS.
MURRAY CITY CORP.> et

al,

DEFENDANT(S)

:"

^dge^«;|Deiuiis^Tr6deirick,
Date :^February |i.8 ;%19 98;;

After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of ^e^Nptice
|t^o§Submit (Plaintiff's Motion for ^Summary : ^
S12 ;f3L998, the Court rules as follows J
^t.V Plaintiff fs Motion ^f or isummary^Jud^nn^
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN MID FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
PLAINTIFF
vs.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
et al,
DEFENDANT(S)

:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY RULING
CASE NO. 960906952 CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Date: February 25, 1998

After review of the 'pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice
to Submit (Plaintiffs Motion .for Summary Judgment) filed February
18, J.998, the Court rules as follows:
1. Given plaintifffs February^, 17, 1998 Withdrawal of Notice to
Submit, the minute entry Tuling of February 18# 1998 is herewith
set aside.
2. Plaintifff s Motion>for Summary Judgment is granted for the
reasons specified in the supporting memoranda.
3. Counsel for plaintiff to prepare the order and judgment*

^Case No: 960906952 CV
Certificate of Mailing
I certify that on the ^ ^ d a y
of
F&K \ 1992, I sent by
first class mail a true and correct copy of the attached document
to the following:
^Donald L. Dalton
50 South Main,~ #1600
pjo. *BOX 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0340

R. Stephen Marshall
Steve K. Gordon
50 South Main, #850
Salt Lake City, UT 84144

^Martin S. Tanner
340 Broadway Centre
ill East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-5250

Randy B. Hart
5025 South State
P.O. Box 57520
Murray, UT 84157-0520

C^
District Court Deputy Clerk

TdbF

r -> .-. - -,

0Y
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Donald L. Dalton (4305)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Facsimile: (801) 534-0058
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF >,\ I 1 I \K I < (»\. IM N
S1A1EOFUTAH
NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation,

ORDER & JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Case No. 960906952
vs.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD,
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD dba Val-Dev,
L.L.C.,
Defendants.
AND RELATED CROSS ACTION, THIRD
PARTY ACTION AND COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment came on before the Court pursuant to Notice
to Submit filed Febntan IM, 1998. Given plaintiffs withdrawal of its previous Notice to
Submit (February 12,1998), the minute entry ruling of February 18,1998 is herewith set
aside. For reasons specified in the Menu w .u \>. 1' 1111 in Support of plaintiffs Motion for
1

Summary Judgment, good cause appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is granted.
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT the counterclaim of defendants Gene V.
Crawford & Sherry T. Crawford dba Val-Dev, L.L.C. (the "Crawfords") is dismissed with
prejudice.
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT all remaining claims, of defendants against
plaintiff are dismissed with prejudice.
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT because the Crawford's cross-claim against
defendant Murray City is based on the same allegations and facts as their counterclaim; and
because Murray City has agreed to abide by the Court's ruling regarding the validity of the
two permits at issue in this case, the Court hereby grants summary judgment in Murray City's
favor on the Crawford's cross-claim.
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiffs claim for damages against the
Crawfords (in the First Amended Complaint) is dismissed with prejudice.
AND FURTHER ORDERED THAT each party shall bear its own attorney's fees &
legal expenses.
AND, FINALLY, ADJUDGED THAT Permit No. 15006, issued by Murray City to
plaintiff, is valid in all respects.

2

M

DATED this ^f^day of March, 1998.

Judge J.
Third 3 ud:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2S*£day of March, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, first class,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER & JUDGMENT, to:
R. Stephen Marshall
Steve K. Gordon
Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar
50 South Main, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Martin S. Tanner
Howe & Tanner
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250
Randy B. Hart
Asst. Murray City Attorney
5025 South State
P.O. Box 57520
Murray, Utah 84157
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.. ..."curr COURT

R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Steve K. Gordon (5958)
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 538-2424
Facsimile: (801)538-2425

SALT

Martin S. Tanner (4419)
HOWE & TANNER
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250
Telephone: (801) 575-7100
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and
Sherry T. Crawford
II! Illl I lllltlt IHhK'IM DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
BY WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE
CRAWFORD AND SHERRY
CRAWFORD MUST FILE A NOTICE
OF APPEAL

v.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD,
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV,
L.L.C.
Defendants.

Civil No. 960906952CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendants Gene V.
Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), through thru undersigned counsel, respectfully
request that this Court extend the time by which the Crawfords mustfiletheir Notice of Appeal until
g:skg\crawford\pleadings\motionfor extension of time

May 30, 1998, or 10 days from the date of entry of an order granting this motion, which ever occurs
later. The Crawfords' motion, which will be unopposed, is supported by the Court's file in this
matter and by the accompanying memorandum.
DATED this 11th day of May, 1998.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

''^Stephen Marshall
Steve K. Gordon
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford
and Sherry T. Crawford

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\motionfor extension of time
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 11th day of May, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE
CRAWFORD AND SHERRY CRAWFORD MUST FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL
to be hand-delivered to the following:
Donald L.Dalton, Esq.
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
and mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Randy B.Hart, Esq.
Assistant Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
Post Office Box 57520
Murray Utah, 84157

^L-

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\motionfor extension of time
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Steve K. Gordon (5958)
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801)538-2424
Facsimile: (801) 538-2425
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Martin S. Tanner (4419)
HOWE & TANNER
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250
Telephone: (801) 575-7100
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and
Sherry T. Crawford

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD,
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV,
L.L.C.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
BY WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE
CRAWFORD AND SHERRY
CRAWFORD MUST FILE A NOTICE
OF APPEAL

Civil No. 960906952CV

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, defendants Gene V.
Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the "Crawfords"), through their undersigned counsel, respectfully

g:skg\erawford\picadings\extension of time memo

submit the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time by Which
Defendants Gene Crawford and Sherry Crawford must File a Notice of Appeal.
ARGUMENT
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, in pertinent part, that a litigant
must file a notice of appeal '"within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from."
Utah R. App. P. 4(e). The extension of that 30-day period is governed by Rule 4(e) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. That Rule states:
The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the
expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule
No extension shall
exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 daysfromthe date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
Utah R. App. P. 4(e). The extension of time allowed by Rule 4(e) is appropriate in this case.
Indeed, on February 25,1998, this Court issued a Minute Entry Ruling in which it granted
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, thereby disposing of all of the issues in this matter. See
Exhibit A. That minute entry indicated that counsel for plaintiff was to prepare an appropriate order
and judgment See id. Plaintiffs counsel did so and mailed a draft to counsel for the Crawfords on
March 12, 1998. See Exhibit B at 3. Thereafter, counsel for the Crawfords caused a letter to be
hand-delivered to plaintiffs counsel, in which he stated the Crawfords' objections to the proposed
order. See Exhibit C. On March 24,1998, plaintiffs counsel mailed an amended proposed order
to counsel for the Crawfords. See Exhibit D at 4. The amended proposed order incorporated most
of the changes suggested by counsel for the Crawfords in his prior letter. See id. Thereafter, on
March 18, 1998, apparently unaware that an amended proposed order had been submitted by

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\extension of time memo
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plaintiffs counsel, the Court signed the initial order. See Exhibit B. Subsequently, on March 31,
1998, the Court signed the amended order. See Exhibit D.
As a result of the foregoing, two orders granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
currently exist. The parties agree that the March 31,1998 is the appropriate order.l Thus, the parties
agree that the date by which the Crawfords had to file a Notice of Appeal was April 30, 1998.
However, counsel for the Crawfords was not aware that the March 31,1998 order had been signed
until May 11,1998; eleven days after the expiration of the 30-day deadline. This delay occurred
because this Court recently relocated to its current building during the time period in question and,
during the move and resulting transition period, counsel for the Crawfords could not make contact
with the court to check on the status of the order for quite some time, despite repeated attempts to
do so. The Crawfords' counsel finally did make contact with the Court on May 11, 1998. Upon
learning that the order had been signed by the Court on March 31,1998, counsel for the Crawfords
immediately contacted plaintiffs counsel to discuss how best to obtain the necessary extension of
time. It was agreed that the Crawfords's counsel would file the motion that is the subject of this
memorandum and that plaintiffs counsel would not oppose the motion. On that same day, the
Crawfords' counsel filed the necessary motion and this memorandum.
CONCLUSION
In light of the short period of time that has transpired since the expiration of the 30-day
deadline, the reasons for that short delay, the fact that the Crawfords' counsel took immediate action
after learning of the problem, and the fact that plaintiffs counsel has stated that he will not oppose

Counsel for the Crawfords represents that he discussed this matter with plaintiff's counsel in his office on May
11, 1998 and that they both agreed that the March 31, 1998 order is the appropriate order.
g:skg\crawford\pleadings\extension of time memo
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the Crawfords' motion, the Crawfords respectfully submit that extending the period of time within
which they mustfiletheir Notice of Appeal is appropriate. Based on the foregoing, the Crawfords
respectfully request that this Court extend the time by which the Crawfords must file their Notice
of Appeal until May 30,1998, or 10 daysfromthe date of entry of an order granting this motion,
which ever occurs later.
DATED this 11th day of May, 1998.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford
and Sherry T. Crawford

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\extension of time memo
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11* day of May, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME BY
WHICH DEFENDANTS GENE CRAWFORD AND SHERRY CRAWFORD MUST FILE
A NOTICE OF APPEAL
to be hand-delivered to the following:
Donald L.Dalton, Esq.
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
and mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to:
Randy B. Hart, Esq.
Assistant Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
Post Office Box 57520
Murray Utah, 84157

g:skg\crawford\pieadings\extension of time memo
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FILED DiSTRiCT COUR1
Third Judicial District

MAY I 2 1998

R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Steve K. Gordon (5958)
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 538-2424
Facsimile: (801) 538-2425
MartinS. Tanner (4419)
HOWE & TANNER
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250
Telephone: (801) 575-7100
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and
Sherry T. Crawford

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME BY WHICH
DEFENDANTS GENE CRAWFORD
AND SHERRY CRAWFORD MUST
FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL

v.
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD,
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV,
L.L.C.
Defendants.

Civil No. 960906952CV
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Based on the motion of defendants Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T. Crawford (the
'Crawfords"), and good cause appearing therefor, the Court ORDERS that the time by which the

g skg\crawford\pleadings\extension of time memo

Crawfords must file their Notice of Appeal is hereby extended until May 30, 1998, or 10 days from
the date of this Order, which ever occurs later.
DATED this /jjky

of May, 1998.

By the Court:

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\extension of time memo
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R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Steve K. Gordon (5958)
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DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 538-2424
Facsimile: (801)538-2425
Martin S. Tanner (4419)
HOWE & TANNER
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250
Telephone: (801)575-7100
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford and
Sherry T. Crawford
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY,
a Delaware Corporation,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 960906952CV

v.
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, a Utah
municipality, GENE V. CRAWFORD,
SHERRY T. CRAWFORD, dba VAL-DEV,
L.L.C.
Defendants.
Notice is hereby given that defendants and appellants Gene V. Crawford and Sherry T.
Crawford (the "Crawfords'*) appeal to the Utah Supreme Courtfromthefinaljudgment of the Third

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\notice of appeal

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, which was
filed in this matter on March 31, 1998.1 The appeal is takenfromthe entire judgment.
DATED this 18th day of May, 1998.
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

R. Stephen Marshall
Steve K. Gordon
Attorneys for Defendants Gene V. Crawford
and Sherry T. Crawford

1

On March 12,1998, the Court executed an Order extending the date by which the Crawfords must file their
Notice of Appeal until May 30, 1998, or 10 daysfromthe date of the Order, which ever occurs later.
g:skg\cra\yford\pleadings\notice of appeal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 18th day of May, 1998,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Donald L.Dalton, Esq.
Bradley R. Cahoon, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Randy B. Hart, Esq.
Assistant Murray City Attorney
5025 South State Street
Post Office Box 57520
Murray Utah, 84157
Martin S. Tanner (4419)
HOWE & TANNER
340 Broadway Centre
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-5250

g:skg\crawford\pleadings\notice of appeal
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1
CITIZENSHIP - DUE PROCESS OF LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; not deny to any person with its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

TabL

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, § 7 - DUE PROCESS OF LAW
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall
be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial
of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable, Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at
any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith
or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them
to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the
affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party
or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

TabN

UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE 4-501 - MOTIONS
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and
documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district courts except proceedings before
the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions for
habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and Service of Motions and Memoranda,
(a) Motion and Supporting Memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions,
exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on
ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum,
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum
is in excess often pages, the application shall include a summary of the memorandum, not
to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to Motion. The responding party shall file and serve
upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a
memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided
in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.

(c) Reply Memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply memorandum
within five days after service of the responding party's memorandum.
(d) Notice to Submit for Decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period to file
a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for Summary Judgment.
(a) Memorandum in Support of a Motion. The points and authorities in support of
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the
record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The points and authorities in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall
state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material
facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless ordered by the
Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or any issues
in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing the principal
memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion may file a written request for a
hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the requesting party.

When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for hearing or notify the
requesting party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion,
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion
shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least two working days before the date
set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and
time of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file their principal
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled
trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited Dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the
court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the
essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule would be impracticable or where the
motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone Conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request may
direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appearance. A
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested
by counsel.
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MURRAY CITY ZONING ORDINANCES, SECTION 17.68.160.C
17.68.160

Off-premise signs.

Except where otherwise prohibited by this chapter, off-premise signs may be erected
and maintained in commercial and manufacturing zones subject to the following conditions:
* * * *

C.
Separation. A minimum of 500 feet radial spacing from any other offpremise advertising sign.

